

Christianity and Society

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The Evidence of Things Not Seen

Ronald A. Landor



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EDITORIALS

the Battle and Above It.

There are always Christians and other positive people who are convinced that must be their business to be above the struggles and battles of history. They feel the heat and the hatred of battle so terrible that refusal to participate in it seems to them the only possibility of maintaining any degree of decency and civility. There are on the other hand always other types, robust in temper and realist in ambition, who are "released" in self, and therefore "redeemed" by their complete devotion to a cause, such as only the pressure and crisis of battle can achieve. They attain a new degree of unselfishness in the patriotic preoccupations of war-time; and they may even compound some hatred of the enemy with this new found devotion to their country. This combination of love and hatred seems to satisfy both the lower and the higher instincts of their nature; and they have no need or desire to transcend the battle.

The true way of life is to be found in neither of these two strategies. There is no possibility of remaining aloof of all the battles of history without being a parasite upon those who fight the battles. Many Christians refuse to believe this because they imagine it possible to believe and maintain justice in the world

without the conflicts into which the tensions of justice periodically degenerate. But if we fully understand the precarious as well as precious character of even imperfect systems of justice, we will know that they must be defended, even if their defense involves us in tragic conflict. On the other hand, it is wrong for any Christian to be completely engulfed in battle.

To be in a battle means to defend a cause against its peril, to protect a nation against its enemies, to strive for truth against error, to defend justice against injustice. To be above the battle means that we understand how imperfect the cause is which we defend, that we contritely acknowledge the sins of our own nations, that we recognize the common humanity which binds us to even the most terrible foes, and that we know also of our common need of grace and forgiveness. To be above the battle must also mean some reverent and pitying comprehension of the vastness of the catastrophe which has engulfed us all, friend and foe, and some sense of pity for the victims of the struggle, whether ally or enemy.

It is not possible for men to escape conflicts. We are men and not God. If a resolute foe seeks to rob us of our dignity as human beings, we might capitulate to his power if only we ourselves

are involved in the degradation. But we cannot preserve our own dignity as human beings if we allow the enslavement of our fellowmen. We are men and not God, and therefore we cannot always escape conflict.

But we are men; and as human beings, created in God's image, we have the capacity to see beyond the immediate situation which threatens to engross us. That is why we cannot or dare not be completely engrossed by it. We must ward off present dangers and not dream of the future; and yet we must think of the future and plan for a better world. We must oppose the cruelty of the enslaver and not dream of an ideal world in which there is no slavery. Yet cruelty must not beguile us into hatred. For hatred is the root of cruelty.

Both the cynics and the idealists tell us that it is impossible to combine these two strategies. The cynics are afraid that any spiritual perspective above the struggle will deflect us from our immediate duties and urgencies. The idealists are afraid that any involvement in the grime and heat of the world's struggles will taint our purity. The idealists ought to know that we are not as pure in the first place as they imagine us to be. The cynics ought to know that men who "look before and after" are stronger and more resolute than those who live only in and for the moment and its tasks.

Whether in war or in peace, we never have any other decent alternative but the double strategy of being in the battle and above it; for peace is full of battles, too, though more covert than those we know as "war." There are alleged heroes of peace who scorn the tasks of obvious conflict, but who are so completely immersed in the battles of peace,

so certain of the rectitude of their cause so implacable toward their foes and so pitiless in their devotions, that the courage of an ordinary soldier belongs to the serenity of the kingdom of God by comparison with their heats and hatreds.

Labor and the Future.

The English *New Statesman and Nation* has been writing most significantly on the future of the Labor Party in Britain. It points out that neither in the ability of its leaders, nor in their will and ambition, does the party represent a serious post-war threat to the conservative class of Britain. Bevin, who seemed for a time to be the logical leader of a radical Britain, has lost prestige in the past year. Sir Stafford Cripps is the most likely alternative to Churchill in the future, but he is no longer a member of the party, and part of his prestige is derived from that very fact.

The long parliamentary truce in the constituencies has weakened the party in its local organizations; and the dominance of the trade unions in the party machinery prevents a genuine democratic development within the party. Furthermore, the leadership is surprisingly old. The average age of its representative in parliament is close to 60.

Coupled with these disabilities are the general cynicism of British people, particularly the younger people, toward the old parties, and their lack of faith in the creative capacity of the parties. The most significant spokesmen of radical opinion in Britain in recent years have been Sir Richard Ackland, a former liberal who has embraced a kind of Christian socialism and was very active in Malvern; J. B. Priestley, the novelist, whose broadcasts have articulated the hopes of the average citizen of Britain; and Sir Stafford Cripps, whose relation to Russia

and freedom from party ties have contributed to his influence.

The *New Statesman* points out that part of the difficulty with the labor party is its inability to appeal to the middle classes, and to agricultural labor. In this respect at least, the defects of the Labor party in Britain represent a universal tendency in the politics of the Western world. It is a defect which demands a more thorough analysis of the whole political situation.

Radical parties, based purely upon industrial labor, have no possibility of gaining a clear majority in any modern country for the simple reason that such labor represents no more than a third of the voting population. The success of the Roosevelt administration has been primarily derived from the fact that it has been able to hold labor, the farmers and the middle class poor together in one political alignment. It has not been able to do this without considerable ambiguity in its political aims; and it has not held solidly because it is Roosevelt's prestige rather than any organic cohesion of these groups which has held the "New Deal" together. Nevertheless, it is not certain that the tentative alignment of these groups, achieved by Roosevelt, will necessarily disintegrate. The present Vice-President might, for instance, be able to hold it together.

But whatever the future of the New Deal in America, it is obvious that the difficult post-war years, in which the struggle between the privileged and the poor is bound to create many new tensions, will bring disaster if a high type of statesmanship is not developed, which is able to formulate economic reconstruction in such a way as to do justice to the peculiar interests of agricultural and middle class interests. Labor is bound

to have a position of leadership in any such alignment. But if it seeks to be the exclusive instrument of economic reconstruction, it will fail. It must be remembered that the very rise of fascism was not unrelated to the inability of socialist parties to make contact with the non-industrial poor. These poor became the proponents and victims of fascism on the continent. In Britain and America there is still the possibility of relating them creatively to democratic movements of reconstruction.

The Peril of Inflation.

By the time these lines are read it is probable that congress will have passed legislation, fixing price ceilings on agricultural products and wages as well as upon other commodities. Meanwhile prices have risen to such a degree that we are already the victims of semi-inflation. The tardiness of the administration is partly due to the very strong support which agriculture has in congress as against the weak support of labor. Congress tried by legislative action to insure higher than parity rates for agricultural goods, and at the same time was prevented from freezing the wage structure prematurely only by astute executive politics. The war labor board has sought to fix wages so that they would go no higher than the 15 per cent advance in living costs since the beginning of the war.

Both farmers and workers are of course quite justified in seeking to gain a more equitable division of rewards in an inequitable system, before prices are finally fixed. Only if the process continues indefinitely, inflation cannot be stopped and both farmers and laborers would be the losers.

The Roosevelt administration has on the whole acted in this matter with

political astuteness. Premature action would have frozen the inequalities of our economic system in terms of extravagant injustice. Yet on the other hand, it is not possible to work for a complete and thorough revision of the economic system in war-time. It must, on the whole, be used as it is, and inflation must be avoided. It is probable that inflation will be essentially avoided, and that tardiness in action will have contributed in some degree to a better distribution of income.

The stubborn resistance of the farm bloc in congress to the anti-inflation program as conceived by the President fortunately failed in the end. That does not mean that farmers have no right to seek a more proportionate share of the wealth of the nation. It only means that they can not do it now without imperiling the security of everyone else. The final stubbornness of the administration upon this point, despite its dependence upon agrarian support is a proof of the vitality of the democratic process. The fact that the President thought it necessary to threaten executive action without congress in order to prompt congressional action was, on the other hand, a sign of great weakness. If the threat was not necessary it was dangerous to make it. If it was necessary the facts which made it necessary are even more ominous. Democracy ceases to function when the interests of groups can no longer be composed by adjustment and compromise but require the imposition of superior power.

The Tax Problem

We may soon know how much income tax each one of us will have to pay. At the moment, a new schedule appears each day with each new vote of the senate fi-

nance committee. There has been much confusion in the shift from one proposal to another; but several things are clear in the situation. One is that the senatorial and congressional leaders are on the whole reluctant to stand against the pressure of the higher income group and that without the influence of the White House and the Treasury we would almost certainly have a very bad income tax law. The higher income groups have tried very hard to foist a sales tax upon the country and only resolute opposition from the Secretary of the Treasury has prevented it. The ostensible, and not completely unjustified argument for the sales tax, is that it alone is able to siphon income out of the pockets of the people quickly enough to prevent inflation. It now seems probable, however, that the same end will be accomplished by a withholding tax, which will subtract some of our income from our pay envelope each month.

The real reasons behind the sales tax campaign are that an indirect tax is politically more palatable than a direct tax because no one knows exactly how much it will cost each family, and that it is the most plausible method of taxing without regard to ability to pay. A sales tax takes the same percentage from \$1000 income as from a \$10,000 one. That is not equitable. It may become necessary, if no other method can be found, to cut down the consuming power of the public. But it ought not to be resorted to except in the most extreme emergency. It will be well to remember moreover, that it is very difficult to get rid of sales taxes once they are adopted. Not a single state, as far as we know, has abolished the sales taxes which almost all the states resorted to during the great depression.

The fact that it is the executive branch of the government which has been protecting the common people against conservative tendencies in the legislative branch is peculiarly revealing. This is partly due to the unique construction of the New Deal, which has won all its political victories because of the popularity of the Roosevelt leadership without being able to reconstruct the Democratic Party into a genuine instrument of liberalism. It thus faces not only the conservatism of the Republican Party in congress, but the frequently more blind and bitter conservatism of the southern democratic reactionaries, who need not fear the poor, because poll tax requirements prevent them from voting in the states from which these southern burbons come.

But there is a deeper reason for the conservatism of the executive branch of the government and the conservatism of congress. Modern technical society has broken down regionalism and many of the peculiar conditions which made representative government representative. The common people find it easier to elect a President who serves their will than to elect a congressman in their local district who is amenable to their influence. Congressmen are much more under the thumb of powerful local pressure groups than the leaders in Washington. The very anonymity of congressmen, their lack of distinction, and the difficulty of keeping track of their votes on various issues, places the general run of electors at a disadvantage in finding and holding the right kind of representatives. But meanwhile, policy, as elaborated by the President, can be understood in broad outline. And it is easier for the poor to unite nationally behind a leader of their choice than to

unite locally for the choice of an adequate representative.

There is of course no guarantee that the Presidential office will be held consistently by a progressive. On the contrary, it is almost certain that the post-war period will produce the usual reaction toward conservatism. But we are in for a period of what Professor Carr calls "mass democracy." In such a period the poor are likely to be better served by a resourceful leader in Washington, if he knows how to translate their desires into action and how to interpret his actions to them, than by the combined force of their local leaders.

Politics and Economics.

The struggle in congress over the tax bill is a harbinger of another new development in modern society. It indicates the gradual ascendancy of politics over economics. The amount which each citizen draws from the common fund of society has been determined to a large degree in the past by various economic processes and relationships which seemed to be almost automatic. They never were wholly automatic of course. Conscious decisions are made in economic life, and those who have the power take advantage of those who are weak. Nevertheless, wages, salaries and profits were partially determined by the contingent factors of supply and demand, of markets and raw materials. In so far as modern technical industry tended to centralize power and privilege, more and more political society, in so far as it was democratic, sought to intervene in the economic process to redress the balances. Thus government has consciously intervened in the economic process more and more in recent decades, to arbitrate economic conflicts, to tax the rich and

pay the poor unemployment benefits, and to interfere in many other ways in the semi-automatic processes of economics.

The war has greatly enhanced this supremacy of political over economic society. The government has become the chief consumer for "private" industry. The government, and not the law of supply and demand, determines who shall have the right to use certain raw materials and for what purpose. The government must determine by what kind of taxation schedule money is to be found for its vast purchases, and what rate of interest is to be paid upon its loans.

These decisions of government are, in the last instance, decisions of the people in a democracy. But they are much more conscious decisions than those which they make in purely economic procedure. Political society is a more self-conscious and a more conscious society than economic society. Thus the eternal conflict between the privileged and the poor will be lifted to a new level of consciousness in the post-war period. Due to general impoverishment, it will also be pitched on a new level tension. It is more difficult to divide a loaf of bread among a dozen hungry people than to divide a million dollars among a thousand ambitious and greedy people. This does not mean that the socialist cliché of the thirties, that an "economy of plenty" would obviate social conflict, is true. Human desires keep pace with historical possibilities. Nevertheless, general impoverishment will increase the difficulty of achieving an equitable division of a community's common fund, or at least of a division which will seem equitable.

The post-war world will face many difficulties. But the problem of building some kind of a world community,

compatible with the necessities of a technical age, will be no greater than the problem of preserving community with in each nation.

The Perils of Sainthood

A gentleman who has just returned from India commented on the Cripps mission and made an interesting observation about the relation of Gandhi to the failure of that mission. Gandhi, he declared, had made the failure of the mission inevitable because four of the ten members of the executive or working committee of the Indian National Congress were persuaded by Gandhi to resist all overtures even before the character of those overtures were known.

The motives which animated Gandhi, declared our informant, were his devotion to the cause of non-violence, rather than any criticism of approval of specific items in the British offer of Indian independence. Gandhi, so our informant argued, saw his policy of non-violence imperiled if the British offer of independence were accepted; for in that case India would fight for its freedom against Japanese attack. If the offer were not accepted, India would also fight, but under the tutelage of Britain; and the saint could, therefore, always maintain that it was not the soul of India which was expressed in this policy. The policy merely represented imperial oppression.

Is it not possible, asked our informant after making this analysis of the situation, that a saint may have as large a stake in his saintly prestige as a rich man has in his money? If you have invested all your spiritual capital in a saintly theory of non-violence and have persuaded millions of people inside and outside of India that it is *the* moral and re-

ious method of achieving justice, would it not be natural for you to avoid the supreme test which would prove or disprove your theory? Suppose you had a dark suspicion that non-violence was an inadequate technique for the avoidance of capitulation to tyranny? Suppose you suspected, though you would not admit consciously, that the non-cooperation of Norway, valuable as it is, is inadequate by itself to overcome Nazi tyranny, and that the Norwegians must, for all the heroism of their non-cooperation, wait until the power of their oppressors is broken by the combined power of the embattled nations? Would you not under the circumstances follow a policy which would not put your theory to the final test?

We regard all these questions as very relevant and as essentially just, though we could not prove that such considerations went through Gandhi's mind. We do not depreciate Gandhi's greatness or saintliness by such dark suspicions. We are merely suggesting that a saint is no more to be trusted than any other man, and that he must be completely free of self-regarding motives in determining policy. That is why, in the final analysis, there are no saints, as Reformation theology has rightly maintained. The whole idea of sainthood is wrong.

The real fact is that saints, if they try too desperately to be saints, are actually caught in exactly the same way that the ordinary man is caught. "Where thy treasure is, there will thy heart be also." If your treasure happens to be a reputation for saintliness, your primary concern must be to remain pure rather than to do your duty in a given situation.

We do not deny that there are people in the world who are rightly regarded as

saintly by their fellowmen. But woe unto them if they regard themselves as saints! Virtue cannot be sought as an end in itself, any more than happiness can be sought directly. Everyone knows that happiness is a by-product. But it seems not to be generally known that virtue is in the same category.

Man Proposes but God Disposes.

As the war goes into its fourth year, it is quite apparent that there is now no possibility of its termination by an early victory over the Nazis. Undoubtedly the German people must be very weary of the war, and the increased bombing of German cities must be effecting morale. But there can be no breakdown in Germany so long as there are German victories.

The desperate defense of Stalingrad cannot hide the comparative success of German arms in Russia. Germany will evidently not be completely victorious in Russia, but she will also not be defeated there. The defeat of Germany must probably wait upon a continental invasion. It is difficult to imagine a final German triumph, despite the comparatively good strategic position of Germany at the present time. The potential power of the United Nations will finally overwhelm Germany, when potentialities become actualities upon the battlefields.

But it must be realized that victory is not possible without a cost which raises its own future problems. Modern mechanized armies require five tons of equipment per soldier. The World War cost us about twenty-five billion dollars. This one may cost our nation alone about two hundred billion. To this negative destruction of wealth we must add the positive destruction, which is affected

by the costly instruments. Whole cities on the continent, particularly in France, Holland, Belgium and Germany, will lie in ruins.

The measurement of so great a cost does not mean that we can be less resolute in carrying the battle through to its conclusion. The alternative to such resolution is still capitulation to tyranny. But the cost of triumph will be so tremendous that we must be prepared for a complete revision of living standards in future decades. The taxes which are now being imposed will last for decades to come, perhaps not in the full severity of the present moment, but in the essential categories which are now being established.

We must be prepared also for many other changes in our life. Nothing could illustrate the limits of human decisions in history more than the inexorable character of those changes. The average person is fighting this war, not so much to achieve a new world order as to protect an old one. Instinctively, most men hope for a return to "normalcy." But the "civilization" which we are defending is being daily altered in the process of its defense. Something much better than we intended may come out of the struggle, though of course, there is also the possibility that it may be worse. Over a hundred years ago an old dynastic ridden Europe defended itself against Napoleon and succeeded in destroying his tyranny. But the new Europe which emerged out of that struggle was quite different than the statesmen of the Congress of Vienna intended.

Perhaps there is some cause for hope in the fact that the new Europe after 1815 was, despite its faults, better than either Napoleon or Metternich intended.

Notes on the World Conflict.

The absence of news from India does not mean that all is well there. It means censorship. Things are going badly indeed in India, and no one can be foolish enough to believe that the incarceration of Gandhi and Nehru solves any problems. Our editorial writers have made much of the fact that the Indian leaders are embarrassing the struggle for freedom of other nations. That may be true; but if so it proves that the Indian problem is no longer merely an Anglo-Indian issue. It has become a problem for all of us. Nor is it surprising if a subject people use the urgencies of a world struggle to further their own cause.

There is no simple solution for the Indian problem. It is not solved by regarding Gandhi as a kind of second Christ who can do no wrong. Immediate freedom under Congress rule is no solution because Congress does not represent the whole of India. Without pretty basic constitutional commitments between the Hindus and Moslems, the withdrawal of Britain from India would mean civil war.

But on the other hand Churchill's intransigence is no solution either. His attitude is in fact catastrophic. American progressive opinion is beginning to remember, as indeed is the case in Britain also, that Churchill has been consistently wrong about India for two decades, however right he may have been about Germany.

The Indian question must be made subject to new negotiations into which the United Nations must be drawn and mediators or negotiators.

Common counsel in regard to India is desirable for other reasons than the

essing nature of the Indian problem. The procedures for the peace of the world must be fashioned to a large degree by habits and precedents set during the conflict. We have the United Nations; but there is little by way of democratic procedure to unite them. Military strategy seems to be increasingly dictated by Washington because our war potential is preponderant. Political strategy in Palestine, India, and the Middle East is, on the other hand, still under the exclusive control of Britain. Nothing would be better, both for the outcome of the war and for the quality of the peace after the war, than more genuinely mutual procedures in the conduct of the war. It is true the war cannot wait upon committee meetings. But broad policies ought to be determined collectively to a larger degree than is at present the case.

The stubborn resistance of the Russians has captured the imagination of the whole anti-Nazi world; and every newspaper reader has anxiously scanned the headlines in recent months to see whether the Russians were still holding. They have yielded to superior mechanized equipment from week to week and day to day; but they have yielded so stubbornly and have exacted so heavy a toll from their enemies, that the robustness of their will to live may yet prove decisive in the conflict, even if they should be defeated. The Russians do not embody the ideal of democracy which the Western world would like to achieve. Our comradeship in arms and in the post-war world with them will present us with many problems. But they do under-

stand some things about life and history which are frequently obscured in the more effete sections of "civilization." They know how desperate the conflicts of history may be and how terrible the price of capitulation is. Their heroic resistance may have little to do with the communist faith, though on the other hand, we dare not deny that it may have given them some resources for the critical hour. More likely the spiritual quality of their resistance is older than communism and not unlike the ability to bear and to suffer, which helped their fathers to conquer Napoleon, or at least to avoid the conquest of Napoleon.

Our dependence upon these Russians is a nice indication of the global character of the war and catastrophe in which we are involved. If Burma capitulates because Burmese had no stake in the conflict in which they were engaged, then imperialistic corruption in the democratic cause has injured all of us. If India endangers our common fate by a not unjustified cynicism about our war aims, our common cause is weakened. If the Russians hold firm, because or despite of a political creed which the Western world abhors, she wins our gratitude and compels us to reexamine our prejudices. (In Britain gratitude to Russia has achieved almost fantastic proportions and will undoubtedly influence the political future.) We are at any rate united with all sorts and conditions of men. Since the future peace of the world demands common work with as many sorts and as queer conditions, this lesson in mutuality under the duress of war is not without value.

ANDRÉ PHILIP: CHRISTIAN; STATESMAN

By EDUARD F. OUELLETTE

In the late summer a news item appeared in the papers noting the fact that Andre Philip had escaped from France to England. It went on to state that he had been made a member of de Gaulle's Cabinet, as Home Secretary.

These two facts, probably hardly noted by most readers, have a certain poignancy for those who may have heard (or read) Professor Philip's Burge Memorial Lecture given in London in 1938 when he said: "It may be the will of God to destroy a nation at a given time. The important thing is not the existence of the nation itself, but the call of God and the planning of God in human history."⁽¹⁾

In the days of the Popular Front in France, M. Philip served as a member of the Finance Committee of the French Government, in charge of Public-Works. While still a professor of economics at the University of Lyons, though not himself a pacifist, he became prominent through his defense in the courts of Jaques Martin, for two years imprisoned as a conscientious objector.

When he spoke in England in 1938 he further declared: "In every age the bonds of solidarity uniting the Christian to his fellow citizens have been bringing before his soul the problems of participation in the struggles of the nation, and,

at the same time, the problem of peace, and of obedience to the Christian message. We have today a new form of the eternal problem."⁽²⁾ "We have definitely today to get rid of the old attitude of so-called non-commitment, that attitude which has brought us to the present situation . . . There is one attitude which is spiritually impossible, namely, the attitude of my minding my own business, and not caring what happens to my neighbor."⁽³⁾ "In the case of international strife . . . the Christian will still go on loving and seeking the truth, trying at each given time, and in each given situation, to look exactly at the reality as it is, and to hear what God is asking him to do. There is a special call of God for every one of us, and a collective call of God for our nation, or for our nations, when many of them are united in a common civilization and in common Christian belief."⁽⁴⁾

Assuming his escape and his new post to be his response to a "special call of God" in a new concrete situation, it may be of interest to hear him speak of his response to a previous "special call of God" in a previous concrete situation, namely, his activities as a member of the Christian Socialist Party in the Popular Front Government. Speaking to a small group called together by Arnold Nash

(1) "Christianity and Present Day International Relations," S. C. M. Press. 1938. p. 22.

(2) Ibid. p. 11.

(3) Ibid. pp. 38-39.

(4) Ibid. p. 32.

London in 1937, Professor Philip examined his convictions as a Christian and as a socialist as follows:

"Only a small group of us call ourselves Christian Socialists. Our basic philosophy is quite simple. I express it this way: I am revolutionary because I am a Christian; I am a socialist because I have studied economic problems. There is no Christian-Socialist doctrine. There is only an answer to a call, a responsibility laid by God upon my conscience *today*. Today I feel, we Christian Socialists feel, this call to urge the realization of a socialist state.

"But this socialist state is only relative. It is our call *today*. Tomorrow our call may be to work against the socialist state. We do not confuse the socialist state with the Kingdom of God on earth. We do strive to bring in the Kingdom of God. We don't even talk about the Kingdom of God. If you do you get things all mixed up.

"The Christian faith contains only negative social principles, not a positive social program. On the basis of the (Calvinistic) doctrine of the sovereignty of God, a Christian is bound to oppose lesser sovereignties. He must oppose social socialism, national socialism, Fascism (black or red), and Communism—which does not exist in Russia today. By the same token, a Christian must oppose capitalism as an economic system claiming absolute sovereignty, recognizing no others but its own. Here a Christian is bound to be a Marxist, because Marxism shows the true picture of capitalism seen from the inside, from the point of view of the worker. Marxism is the philosophy of suffering socialism. It will not be the philosophy of triumphant socialism. I am not a socialist because I am a Christian, but because I am Christian, I

am *anti* these other systems which claim sovereignty.

"As for our program, what is needed is the collective organization of production, the basic industries, and the financial system. This does not necessarily mean state control. It means general organization like that of the Bank of France where only two of the twelve directors are nominated by the stockholders, the others being nominated by functioning economic groups such as labor unions, cooperatives, etc. That is what we believe is coming—not state control or control by the proletariat, but a super-control by groups like trade unions and cooperatives, a control super-imposed on the present privately owned and managed organization. Thus will be overcome the present crisis of unbalance between capital goods and consumer goods.

"The success of our program rests on the achievement of political power. We believe political power lies with the working classes, assisted by the peasant and middle classes. The working classes have been the suffering group. Historically the long-suffering group contains the leadership for the future. There are three stages in the realization of this leadership. (1) *Class instinct*. This is reactionary, advocating return to the older order, like the Indians wanting the spinning wheel instead of machinery, like the group in America wanting craft unions instead of industrial unions, like the middle class in Germany defending the capitalistic system and voting for Hitler. (2) *Class struggle*. This struggle is an internal struggle; it goes on *inside* the old system. The class struggle is carried on within the capitalistic system, but because it is internal it is no less a struggle. (3) *Class consciousness*. This

third stage in the realization of leadership inevitably transcends class, achieving something higher, feeling a class *mission*, a historical duty. This stage is triumphant socialism. France is entering this third stage, with a greatly enlarged view of 'the working class'. Teachers, managers, technicians, even high officials in France belong to trade unions. Everyone is proud to be a socialist.

"The reason our time is a time of crisis is that no one can be outside the capitalistic system any more: farmers, small merchants, everybody is caught inside the net. Utopian economic islands are now an impossibility. The middle class in most countries is in stage one of the three stages I mentioned. Becoming conscious of their class they tend to be reactionary. Holding small socially harmless property they incline to defend the capitalistic system which allows others to use large property to wield socially harmful power. Labor showed this same reactionary tendency at first. It wanted to return to the medieval guild system. As for the middle class, now feeling a 'class instinct,' Fascism is its first reaction when its position is undermined by the evolution of capitalism.

"We base our policy in France on the need to save the middle class from Fascism. This has been largely accomplished. The same economic group that support Hitler in Germany vote socialist in France. The critical day came for us on February 6, 1934. One thing made our job easier: while the French middle class is conservative economically, it is left wing politically because of its heritage from the French Revolution. This made the middle class have sympathy with a leftist government. But the working class—where the leadership lies—has to keep on saving the middle class from

Fascism. The Labor Movement must be the center of all the democratic forces. It is the largest movement and it has the longest history as a class. It has moved farthest along toward the realization of its leadership. As a Christian I feel called to work inside the Labor Movement, against the capitalistic system.

"The will of God is often to destroy. Christianity has clear negative principles: a Christian must work *against*. Christians have worked *against* other systems before now. But a Christian must always remember that the system which replaces the one he seeks to destroy is not to be confused with the Kingdom of God on earth. Christians worked against slavery. Slavery was replaced by serfdom. But serfdom was not the Kingdom of God. Therefore Christians worked against serfdom replacing it with the wage system which is better, but our industrialism is not the Kingdom of God. In certain countries the wage system has been replaced by collectivism. But you wouldn't say Russia was the Kingdom of God. When we have socialist collectivism triumphant in France, it will be the duty of the Christian to work against this collectivism, knowing that what replaces it will even then not be the Kingdom of God.

"At the present time the call of God comes to me as a Christian Socialist to work inside the triumphant working class, to criticize from the inside. Thus to the French socialists I preach Christianity. I preach what they need, just as to Christians I preach socialism. This is possible in a democratic country. In Russia there is no more criticism from the inside. The working men, under necessity, have abdicated into the hands of a group. Without criticism, any system feels itself ultimate, final. The result is

ssia is Red Fascism. The function of the Christian is to keep alive the democratic spirit in all movements. The Christian himself is like two people: the man who hears the call of God, and the man doing his job today in answer to that call. Just as any movement needs criticism from the inside so the Christian must criticize everything he does, knowing that his act today is neither perfect nor final.

Sin for the Christian is regarding any act as perfect or final, is universalizing a particular call of God. If he says, for example, *this* system, the socialist system, is the true Kingdom of God, the Christian commits sin. If he says such a thing, he tries to lay hold upon God, he tries to bind God to a human system. As I call atheism, putting man above God.

What about the church? The church—by *the church* I mean the preacher in his pulpit and the official religious bodies—must declare *against* all lesser sovereignties than the sovereignty of God. The pulpit must speak against all lesser claims for man's complete loyalty, and open the way for the Kingdom of God to come to each man. The church must send its people out to hear the call of God for themselves and go and *do*. The church must declare the sovereignty of God.

The church exists to nourish a new revelation. While Marxism, as I said, may be the true revelation for the suffering workman and the suffering small business man inside the capitalistic system, a new revelation will be necessary to guide the triumphant workingman. Marxism cannot suffice as the philosophy of triumphant socialism. When the working class is through with its class struggle and feels its class mission, it will

need a new philosophy transcending Marxism. It is this new philosophy, this new revelation, which the church must nourish.

"The church must stand against certain powerful lines of propaganda which might be used by Christians who have heard the call of God, even though these lines of propaganda make a powerful appeal. For example, the Catholics in France are trying to organize Catholic labor unions and are using as their line of argument: 'If the bosses were good men all would be all right,'—with the inevitable conclusion in the minds of the workmen: 'Hate the bad boss.' The Christian Socialist says that the *system*, not the boss, is bad, that the boss is being as good as he can be, that the boss and the small merchant and the farmer are all suffering under the system. The result in France is that the boss has responded: 'That's right, I am doing the best I can. I'll help you change the system.' The bosses have joined the working class and the peasants and the small merchants to make the Popular Front.

"We Christian Socialists work now for the Popular Front because we see it this way. We own only the sovereignty of God. The Popular Front enlists all who suffer under the lesser sovereignty of capitalism: workmen, bosses, farmers, small merchants, technicians, teachers. We are all workingmen now. We are the Popular Front."

II.

With this background, it is easy to see that the Burge lecture, given the next year, stands as a further development of Andre Philip's view of the relation between political action and Christianity. The special interest in the excerpts which follow lies in their relation to specific

aspects of the present situation: the State's need for violence! irresponsible pacifism; the line of action for the Christian conscientious objector; the relation of Democracy and Christianity.

First speaking further of the general problem of the use of the word "Christian" as an adjective, Professor Philip has this to say: "I do not think that any social or international attitude can be called Christian. I believe that there is a difference in nature between *any* human activity and the Christian message. . . . We cannot speak of any social realization, or of any social policy, or of any international policy as being a Christian policy. . . . I do not believe in any Christian politics, either social or international, because it seems to me that the Christian Message is not at all an ethical rule. I do not believe that Jesus was a moralist."⁽⁶⁾

Pursuing this thought, Professor Philip introduces the striking concept of this ethical moralism being a sort of spiritual capitalism, and as such, just one more revolt against God. When a man says that the Christian life is no more than obedience to a universal ethical rule, in effect he tries to make God his own property. It is as if he says to Him: " 'If You have been calling me to do this here and now, You are obliged to call me to do the same thing always, and to call other people to do the same thing.' This is not a Christian attitude."⁽⁷⁾ Put the other way round: "The Christian life is chiefly an attitude of obedience to special calls from God. . . . Both in social and international affairs there may be a great

number of different personal calls for different Christians."⁽⁸⁾

Professor Philip hastens to correct this implied negative anarchy and separateness by affirming that "Christianity is something which comes to the whole man, and to everything in man, and which affects him in his individual life, his professional life, his social life, his citizen life, his class life and his national life. . . . The Christian knows that he is a man in the world linked up with all other men in complete solidarity. . . . The Christian message is a message to all men. . . . The world is not only the place where we live, fight, suffer, and are tempted. It is not only the environment of our spiritual struggle, but the world is the object of salvation."⁽⁹⁾ Very definitely Christianity is *for* the world, and the Christian is *in* the world, though not *of* the world.

While M. Philip quite categorically states that as a Christian he cannot "accept the *sovereignty of the State*", he acknowledges that it is "an expression of the will of God . . . the bearer of power in the national community . . . a technical way of keeping peace and order."⁽¹⁰⁾ It is here that violence comes into the discussion. "The State needs power. Sometimes the State needs violence . . . (but) the State is always in the realm of compromise . . . (and) in itself cannot become absolute."⁽¹¹⁾

Does this mean that the pacifist has made the Christian response in rejecting the authority of the State? Does this mean that every Christian must be a conscientious objector? M. Philip's own

(6) Op. cit., pp. 13-14. "Le Problème d'une Sociologie Chrétienne" by Paul Conord, (Paris, 1936), is one of the few volumes which treats this problem directly and extensively. This has not appeared in English, though it has been translated by the author of this essay.

(7) Ibid., p. 15.

(8) Ibid., pp. 15-16. (9) Ibid., pp. 17-18. (10) Ibid., p. 23. (11) Ibid., p. 23.

never answers both these questions in a negative. His recorded answer is more equivocal. "I think this (pacifism) is a possible attitude if certain conditions are present." But the pacifist cannot say: "I will never fight. . . . My pacifism tells me that I will not take any responsibility for what is happening in Czechoslovakia today." I do not call that a pacifist; I call him a man who refuses to take cognizance of his own responsibilities."⁽¹²⁾

Any over-emphasis of the value of non-violence appears as an aspect of this responsibility. To say that non-violence enjoys any spiritual superiority is putting an ethical reality in the place of a religious one and of believing that an act in itself has a special value."⁽¹³⁾ An uncritical belief that non-violence will succeed falls into the "optimistic belief which under-estimates the power of sin in the world."⁽¹⁴⁾ So while certain men may be called to give a special testimony assuming the attitude of absolute non-violence, others may have a "special call" and find themselves under the necessity of realizing that they have to fight, or let "weak people be dominated by bad ones and killed or destroyed."⁽¹⁵⁾

Here Professor Philip gives his meaning for the term "conscientious objector." It has little if any relation to the specific act of fighting as understood by the military mind. "A Christian is always a conscientious objector. Always there is *something* to which his conscience objects and which he cannot accept. The Christian will always love, and the Christian will always seek and speak the truth. Even in a war he will love

and he will never accept domination by the spirit of hate. He will never be taken out of himself by all the parades of the armies of soldiers, or develop a purely sentimental feeling. If the Christian has to fight, he will fight, having recognized that this is less bad than anything else that he can do in the given concrete situation.

The point is that the Christian must act, must respond to the call of God in every situation. What is happening in the world "*is* our business as Christians." To be a Christian is to be responsible.

Professor Philip is now with the Free French Government, doing what he can to maintain the framework of democratic processes. This presentation of his view of the relation between political action and Christianity may well close with his thought on democracy. He might have spoken yesterday.

"We all realize that we are in the middle of the remaking and rebuilding of our society, and we do not know exactly in what direction we are going. We still believe that civil liberties create the best possible framework for the evolution of economic and social life which may take the most different and the most conflicting forms, but in which the value of human personality stands first. Even if people are losing their Christian faith, they are still receiving all their strength and all their life from Christianity. Democracy is the system which puts in the first place neither the State, nor the nation, nor society, but this human personality, which by nature is not a very great thing, but it is the thing for which Christ died on the Cross."⁽¹⁷⁾

⁽¹²⁾ Ibid., p. 27. ⁽¹³⁾ Ibid., p. 28. ⁽¹⁴⁾ Ibid., p. 28. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Ibid., pp. 29-30.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Ibid., p. 35.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DEMOCRACIES

By EDUARD HEIMANN

It is essential for any discussion of the future to take stock of Soviet achievements and aspirations and their relation to the life of the Western countries.

I.

In the era before the rise of Fascism we used to say that socialism and communism were the living protests of the victims of a self-contained, supposedly harmonious bourgeois world. This is still true and has even been confirmed by the positive achievements of the Soviet in remedying some of the worst grievances. The Soviet has built its industry, on the largest scale, on the basis of a plan which eliminates the profit motive from the economic strategy; it has thus avoided unemployment, the scourge of capitalist industry. The profit motive has been subordinated, not suppressed; with increasing emphasis on the differentiation of individual earnings and on individual responsibility for profitable management of productive establishments, the role of the profit motive is in the ascendancy. What has been suppressed is private capital ownership in productive establishments, which would yield unearned incomes. That these things can be done (although they should be done differently in several respects) is a vitally important lesson for the timid democracies in the face of glaring injustices of income distribution and of peace-time depression and unemployment.

What is, in the language of economics, a planned economy is likely to be a bureaucratic economy in the language of sociology. The problem of bureaucracy in Soviet Russia is farther from solution than any other problem. The original promise had been that workers would take turns in administrative posts thus preventing the formation of any special caste of officials; this is the presupposition of the programmatic "withering away of the state." Instead, higher education, such as is required for the administrative functions of so-called "engineers," is now set apart from general education, made inaccessible to workers' families by special fees, and reserved almost exclusively to the families of officials. The percentage of active workers in the party congresses used to be publicized as a matter of special pride; it is now suppressed. A new ruling class is in the process of formation (See the richly documented article by S. Schwarz, "Heads of Russian Factories," in *Social Research*, September 1942.) There are even strong reasons to suspect that, parallel to events in England, it was the bureaucracy which pursued the appeasement policy towards Hitler, while the people are responsible for the fury of Russian resistance.

It would be incorrect to say that the Soviet knows no economic crises. It has had several, arising specifically from its own social pattern. Leaving earlier difficulties aside, the cruel famine of

192-33 was the effect of a strike by the farmers against their forcible collectivization. Individual holdings, the prize of the revolution, were put together in large producers' co-operatives, for reasons of easier economic and political control as well as of assimilation to the collectivist proletarian pattern. The strike forced the Soviet to concede to the peasants individual houses, gardens, and livestock on the collective farms. The new pattern seems to be firmly established now. The new differentiation between the aspirations of industrial workers and those of farmers has been spectacularly confirmed by the Soviet declaration, on the invasion of Finland, that Finland must not be Sovietized outright because it is not a predominantly industrial-proletarian country. Since Russia had been so Sovietized, although 90 per cent of her people were not industrial proletarians at that time, the declaration on Finland represents a major step toward economic democracy.

Collectivization was facilitated in industry and made possible in agriculture by the very low level from which the system started and which gave it the unique chance to take advantage of all technical and organizational improvements long since achieved in the Western world on an individualistic basis. While heavy industry in the saturated West was in the throes of depression, for lack of an outlet for its output, the vast Soviet empire was hungry for machines and buildings. The reorganization of agriculture was made palatable to the peasants by bringing them those technical improvements which Western farmers had accomplished by way of special cooperatives for credit and for the use of machines in turns; these cooperatives supplement and strengthen

the family holdings instead of supplanting them.

II.

The social and political organization is more monolithic than the organization of production. The labor unions are entirely dominated by the state; they are in no way instruments of democratic self-expression. Rather are they part of the dictatorial political organization. With ten million people, every twentieth Russian, in concentration camps or forced labor, even apart from the one or two million Poles who were added after the annexation of Eastern Poland, it is difficult to share the enthusiasm of some writers for the spontaneous unity and democratic freedom of the Russian people.

It is true that the political structure was supposedly liberalized by the constitution of 1937. But it is extremely doubtful to what extent it was so liberalized, in view of the unabridged privileges of the "one party" (articles 126 and 141) and of the secret police (articles 113 and 117). Nevertheless it would be wrong to dismiss the constitution as irrelevant. It does what no fascist "constitution" could ever do: it proclaims, in unmistakable terms, the value of liberty and makes it legitimate to measure the world, including the Soviet, against this yardstick. But the emphasis on the principle of democratic liberty is, for the time being, more a matter of principle than of practice. On the other hand, the original confusion of liberty with private license, with informal mating, informal divorce, and abortion, has long since been rescinded, under the pressure of the peasants, and to the disappointment of many Western intellectuals.

The quite unique accomplishment of the Soviet in the field of political organization, and one of historical significance, is the solution of the nationality problem in the vast multi-national country. This, incidentally, must be credited to Stalin personally. It has not been achieved in the liberal way, by ignoring group differences and making individuals as such legally equal, but by emphasizing group characteristics and differences and putting all groups on an equal footing of cultural and educational rights and facilities. (Compare Reinhold Neibuhr's proposals for solution of the Jewish problem.) Even the most sceptical observers have failed to detect any trace of discrimination. Only a few writers suspect that there is some anti-semitism, but if so it is certainly kept within limits.

III.

The ambivalence of the Soviet structure is reflected in its spectacular career during these last three years.

The Soviet and its foreign adherents have helped bring down, for the benefit of Hitler, the French Republic, as they had helped to destroy the German republic. The Soviet officially proclaimed that the British had "criminally attacked" Nazi Germany for imperialistic reasons. German communists, refugees from Hitler savagery, distributed anti-British pamphlets in London in mid-war. American communists invented the slogan that Roosevelt was out to "plow under our boys" for the benefit of British imperialism. Communist rage against the British appeasers, who encouraged Hitler to turn on the Soviet, was fully justified, and the Soviet success in beating the appeasers at their own game was triumphant. But it was the British people in their outraged sense of

fairness who first forced war on the appeasers and then threw them out. Only when Britain had unshakably endured her darkest hour and Russia's hour came did the Soviet recognize that Britain was fighting "for the defense of democratic liberty." It is not a brilliant record. The record since then has been more than brilliant.

The democracies too had been aiding Hitler. Their moral and political weakness had tolerated persistent mass unemployment at home and a complete economic breakdown in the small states of Southeastern Europe which they had established at Versailles. They left it to Hitler to abolish unemployment by building his military machine and to draw those small states into the German economic orbit. Their appeasers had deliberately strengthened Hitler, and their pacifists obstructed any preparation to meet the menace.

But the difference between the democracies and the Soviet in aiding Hitler must be understood. The democracies were imperfect, in terms of their own standards; it was their moral and political weakness of which Hitler took advantage. But the Soviet was what it was supposed to be according to its program. It was supposed to be totalitarian, i.e., to subordinate all human and spiritual considerations to its political goal (on the theory that this goal implies all human virtues and that those in charge of executing it need not be restrained since they are immune to the temptation of power). Hence the formal affinity between this type of totalitarianism and the Hitler brand, and their common contempt for degenerate democracy. This made collaboration between them possible.

But though communism is certainly opposed to the democracies, it still crit-

es them for violating their own basic principles of peace, liberty, and justice. With communism and the West recognize these principles as the objectives of social organization and action. This is what makes communism, essentially, a part of the Western world, and not an exclusively negative reaction like fascism. In other words, the fact that the Soviet, after many vicissitudes, was tossed into the camp of the democracies by world history is logical.

The difficulty lies in this dual fact, that communism shares the Nazi methods of government, but applies them in the service of ideals which it shares with the democracies. Since the invasion of Russia the Soviet has made a start in drawing some democratic conclusions. No reference to any special feature of communist theory or practice is to be found in Stalin's official war manifesto to the Russian people; defense of democratic liberty is his whole program. Even the churches emerged from twenty years of persecution into partnership in the common battle.

IV.

Totalitarianism is the anti-Christian element in communism. The program symbolized as the withering away of the state, envisages a self-contained world of man, redeemed from evil once and for all by the logic of the economic process and the wisdom of the men supervising. In the first and opposite stage of the

development, the dictatorial class and its leaders act as the infallible trustees of that salvation, immune to the corruptions of power and inspired only by the spirit of their mission. If so, who could dare to restrain them? This supposedly scientific proposition rationalizes every act of violence and trickery. It has become a pseudo-religious dogma, the center and meaning of life for many millions, and has superseded the Christian dogma which they contemptuously reject because of its overtly dogmatic character.

But communism is not paganism. It propagandizes in terms of peace, liberty, and justice, ideas derived from Christianity; it is a part of the Christian world which it opposes. The common heritage proves to be more fundamental than the antagonism. Communism is a Christian heresy. Its heretical character, its reliance on the redeeming force of man, or of certain men, is responsible for the absurdity of its logic and the atrocity of its politics. But its objective (contrary to those of fascism in which peace and liberty are ridiculed as unvirile and degenerate, and justice is only another name for the rule of the master race) makes communism our ally and permits the hope that some re-Christianization will be thrust on the official Soviet doctrine by the profoundly Christian Russian peasants, from below, and by the alliance with the West, from without.

THE PREACHER AND THE PEOPLE

By LISTON POPE

"A true preacher would willingly see the whole community prophesy."

These are words of Melchior Hoffman, a Baptist leader of the sixteenth century. The passage in which they occur might well be framed above the desk of every preacher:

"God's community knows no head but Christ," wrote Hoffman. "Teachers and ministers are not lords. The pastors have no authority except to preach God's word and punish sins . . . A true preacher would willingly see the whole community prophesy."

Such counsel may seem impractical to men who find themselves in position of leadership in the Church. These words may have been pertinent in the sixteenth century; they appear archaic when viewed against the specializations and complexities of the twentieth. How can the religious beliefs of the average parishioner be as competent as those of refined philosophical thought? Why should the ethical standards of ordinary people, immersed in struggle for their own survival, be considered as important as those of men who have steeped themselves in the study of ethics? Why should the layman be granted authority equal to that of the professional in matters of ecclesiastical or public policy, except in the common privilege of helping to pay the bills?

These questions are not posed in order to discredit them. They raise real problems—problems which are central for democracy in church and commun-

ity, in nation and world. Surely the expert, the specialized leader, and the trained manager have legitimate and indispensable places in any kind of society. The good society is not to be achieved by reducing all competence and all authority to the lowest common denominator. On the contrary, the function of leadership is to lead. The minister who has no vision of next steps and no commitment to adventurous programs does not deserve the name of leader. To a degree seldom equalled in history, the Church needs at this moment men who know in whom they have believed and for what they are willing to fight with all their strength and soul.

But the function of leadership, more specifically, is to lead people, and to lead them into their own fulfillment, rather than to secure special privilege or irresponsible power for the leader himself. This central purpose is easily perverted in the Church as in more secular spheres. The pulpit often seems a heaven-sent vehicle for demonstrating the sublimity of one's most elevated thoughts, even if the pew is left vacant or bewildered as a consequence. The preacher frequently comes to deserve Disraeli's philippic against Gladstone, becoming "a sophisticated rhetorician inebriated by the exuberance of his own verbosity." In other matters he likewise faces the pitfalls of advantaged position. He may readily convert the official board of the church into an instrument of proper

man becomes obstinate—and occasionally there is one who does—there are all-known ways and means of managing it. The young people's society becomes a studio in which the minister, pairing of the older people and seeking more plastic material, molds according to his own peculiar dreams the form of the brave new world. And how subtle the minister transmutes the reverence of parishioners, for his person and spirit to haughtiness of person and condemnation of spirit!

Against such perils there is only one defense: to know at first hand and cherish without dissimulation the testimony of the people. Such knowledge can be gained only at first-hand; it is too wonderful for books. It is that for which all study of books is only a preparation. Books are concerned mostly with stories of lords and ladies, pressure groups and military exploits, grand schemes and great ideas. The people can never be compressed between the covers of a book. Indeed. They cannot even be defined; efforts at definition of them, whether by politicians, communists, or scholars, always end in inadequate abstractions. The people cannot be known by definition, but only by communion.

The people are all of us and more than any of us; they are a community one knows and all the communities one has ever seen. They are selfish, and they are the only ultimate altruists. They are short-sighted, and they are the only ones whose dreams survive. They are ignorant, and they possess a deep wisdom hidden from the learned. They are a fiction of history, but they are the stuff of destiny. They know what they want and where they stand, not in a self-conscious fashion which prizes consistency or

probes assumptions, but in an immediate commitment which rolls up at last into a terrible purpose. They are suppressed—countless ones die, as Sherwood Anderson told us, "with all their music in them," unuttered, unexpressed. But they always rise again. They are preyed upon by the subtle blandishments of demagogues and led astray by false prophets, but they swallow their deceivers. They are thwarted by their own massiveness, but they move on like a mighty river, leaving each eddy and whirlpool behind. They are the people, and they will not be forever dammed up in expression and diverted in purpose.

A true preacher would willingly see the whole community prophesy. A preacher can manage a program, but only a community of people under God can build a church. And the testimony of the people about God is the living faith by which the church moves on.

The testimony of the people about other things is likewise crucial for the preacher, and for the future of society. Nothing that affects people is foreign to the parish of the minister. The preacher is not only a spiritual leader of his people; in that role alone, he must know all their disappointments and their fondest hopes, and must be concerned with all things that contribute to either. This necessity has seldom been better demonstrated than in a little book about a Confessional pastor which came out of Germany recently. Entitled, "A Village on a Hill," the book shows how the pastor, in simple concern for his people and the integrity of their faith, went inevitably at last to a concentration camp. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid. All things that affect the life of the community—economic, political, educational, or whatever—are part of the instant

business of a spiritual leader of the people.

Divorce from the people may become the principal tragedy of our American Protestant Churches. Increasingly we ministers to a particular segment of the population, and the masses of men seek elsewhere for life's meaning. We are repeating the age-old mistake of the successful institution. An example is offered for our instruction in the fate of the Russian Revolution. In his book *Darkness at Noon*, Arthur Koestler puts into the mouth of an old Bolshevik an interpretation of the early success of that revolution and of its subsequent betrayal:

"At the time of the revolution," Rubashov said, "we were called the Party of the Plebs. What did the others know of history? Passing ripples, little eddies and breaking waves. They wondered at the changing forms of the surface and could not explain them. But we had descended into the depths, into the formless, anonymous masses, which at all times constituted the substance of history. . . . We dug in the primeval mud of history and there we found her laws. We knew more than ever men have known about mankind; that is why our revolution succeeded. And now you have buried it all again. . . ."

At the present moment, knowledge of the people is of decisive import for leadership of every kind. For we stand again in a revolutionary moment in which revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces struggle for mastery. Sensing deep needs which have been denied, demagogues have arisen to capitalize on popular discontents and hopes. They cunningly attempt to satisfy one segment of the people by dividing the people themselves, with doctrines of a master

race (the shame of which is reflected in our own treatment of racial minorities) with grandiose plans for New Order which would allot peoples to victory with talk of an American Century which would dominate the world. Desperate stratagems, centering around the concept of totalitarianism, have been employed in an effort to control the people from above.

Some of the people—far too many—have been fooled. But the masses march on. This war is a symptom both of their deception and of their refusal to be deceived. We have talked about this war, those of us who love abstract generalizations, from nearly every standpoint except that of the people. We have debated of democracy and fascism, of the threats to civil liberties and social gains, of the challenge to civilization, of pacifism and militarism. Doubtless we know what we mean by such terms. But the people seem less concerned with militarism than with bravery and integrity, less interested in pacifism than in peace, less troubled over civil liberties than over elementary satisfactions of life, less fearful about civilization than about the violability of their homes. The simpler, primeval values have become the real issues of the war, and only a leadership which knows and cherishes those values will prove adequate for victory and peace.

A strange thing is coming to pass in the midst of war. To older ingredients of national interests and imperialistic struggle, a new factor has been added, and it bids fair to become the dominant characteristic of this new kind of total conflict. Vice-President Wallace pointed to this novel thing recently when he said that this has become a people's war, leading toward a people's century. In increasing measure it has become a strug-

in which the great masses of the world
rising and becoming articulate.
ere are the masses of Russia, who have
hold on powerful inspiration; masses
China, waging a long war by sheer
er of devoted numbers; masses of
rmany, betrayed by false formulations
legitimate rights but fighting with
assion for the rights themselves; masses
Britain and America, gaining strength
arly in organization and in political
nowledge, and becoming vocal about
things for which they fight.

The people, the little people who win
s, are marching. Well may the
ghty of every nation tremble before
terrible lowly. The makers of jaun-
ed headlines may well learn that they
not control the masses of men, and
makers of demagogues know that
cynical chicanery is being ferreted
Vindication is coming for the simple
h of a tall homespun man who knew
at last the people would not be
ed.

Those who would lead in this hour
st know the fierce needs and hopes of
inary men, and bring them fulfill-
nt. Prophetic leadership, whether in
ms of social structure or in human
rts, will fall to those who discover

where the people are going. For those
who dread the implications, the old
slogans will remain for a time. The
Axis program, seeking to divide and
rule, comprises an effort at the greatest
counter revolution in history. But the
symbols of the future are emblazoned
on the banners of the people, and they
will not fall short of victory.

A true minister would willingly see
the whole community prophesy. The
testimony of the people is often obscur-
ed by selfishness, crushed under oppres-
sion, darkened in sin. It must come
clear and true: clear as the day when man
was made, true as the purpose of God
for His creatures. Ministers are not sent
forth simply to be successful practition-
ers of an honorable profession or to
achieve privileged places for themselves.
Preference before the altar belongs to
the priesthood of all believers. Preach-
ers must go to the people—for the peo-
ple falter and fall as they march. A true
preacher goes to undergird their bodies
with health and food, to surround their
families with houses in the sun and with
leisure that creates, to bring security and
responsibility in their relations with one
another, and to show them a still more
excellent way for all their living.



HOW TO FIGHT HITLER IDEOLOGICALLY

By MAXIMILIAN BECK

The ideological war against Nazism can be waged successfully only if the following points are taken into consideration:

1) What makes the Nazi ideology a world-wide danger is the fact that it is used as a very effective weapon in raising in every country a minority of fifth and sixth columnists.

2) The success of Nazi propaganda among the most different sorts of nation shows that the inclination to accept the Nazi ideology has nothing to do with any special predisposition of the German nation.

Nazism must not be confused with German militarism. The latter might really be rooted in the German soul; certainly it is not contagious to other nations. However, it may be admitted that Germany was particularly well conditioned for Nazism by her militarism.

3) The dilettantism, foolishness, and untruthfulness of the Nazi propagandistic literature should not cause us to overlook the many serious scientists and philosophers who have unknowingly and unintentionally supplied Nazism with all the constituent parts of its ideology. Indeed, the real facts of biology, sociology, history, and psychology seem to support Nazism. Furthermore, modern civilization, with the standardization and centralization which technology has brought about, presents a very serious problem for the defenders of democracy.

In discussing all these problems one will have to realize that one cannot fight the Nazi ideology, as many assume, in the naturalistic and positivistic way of stating facts, but in opposing ideas and ideals to the terrible facts of nature and history to which the Nazi ideologies refer triumphantly and cynically. A man must not be taken as a passive object of his natural drives and environment, but as an active subject, capable of opposing them, shaping and controlling them, while he is motivated by reason, by the ideas and ideals whose validity cannot be refuted by any facts of nature and history.

4) The entire Nazi ideology is biologicistic, because biologism was the dominant philosophy when Nazism came into being. Nazis like to call their ideology irrational because they confuse all rational explanation with a reduction of parts related to each other mechanically and causally. But although reason has nothing to do with mechanistic thinking, it should be realized that it is, indeed, impossible to reduce biological phenomena to physical phenomena.

The way, therefore, to fight the biologicistic Nazi ideology is to start, not from a still lower mechanistic point of view but from the higher spiritualistic one. And it is easy to show the complete hopelessness of all Nazi attempts to reduce spiritual realities to biological ones. But so far very little has been done to

ard fighting Nazism and Nietzsche, its most important supporter, in the way above described.

5) German trade unions were dominated by a materialistic point of view, and German universities had a naturalistic view of science; keeping this in mind one has to realize that "the strongest centers of opposition to the claims of God-faith were *not* universities, trades unions, political parties, courts or organized businesses. In Germany and the occupied countries the institution that stands up most stoutly against the pretension of the Nazi New Order is the church."⁽¹⁾

Accordingly the romantic and mystic pretence of the propagandistic literature of the Nazis, their flirtation with medievalism and their references to obscure intuition and the like must not mislead us into believing that romanticism or mediaevalism has anything to do with Nazi ideology. This mystic pretence is nothing but a cloak, similar to the pretended crusade against communism. In this way they hope to win the romantic youth and the more religious and conservative people—just as they appeal, in the opposite way, to the very sober cynicism of their "realistic" opponents through geopolitical slogans.

Thus romanticism could be made responsible for a vague Spiritualism and exaggerated subjectivism rather than a blood-and-soil materialism and anti-individualistic attitude, and that idolatry of Race and State which characterize Nazism. The old Hegel was certainly not a romanticist. And one must not forget the cosmopolitan tendencies of romanticism which balance its nationalistic character. This is also manifested in the translations which the romanticists

made of writers of non-German nationality. One renders too much honor to the anti-spiritual character of Nazism if one derives its ideology from a movement which interpreted even inanimate nature as a self-alienation (*Entaeusserung*) of Spirit—the term "Spirit" being used here in the only correct and un-metaphorical meaning of subject of consciousness. Nazis use the term Spirit in contradictory ways, now identifying it with intellect and opposing it to life, calling the latter soul, and then identifying Spirit with life and opposing it to intellect. They use it in the latter sense in order to render an air of "idealism" to their merely biologicistic aspect of man by calling spiritual what cannot be experienced mechanically, just as they also call it irrational. Thus results the funny identification of spiritual and irrational. This implies a conversion of Spirit and Reason into their opposite.

But this ambiguous use of "Spirit" is a clever trick, for it enables Nazism to pretend to spirituality by contrasting itself with movements like Marxism and Freudianism which it calls "materialistic" because they attempt to reduce spiritual values to animal ones—just as Nazism does itself.

As to mediaevalism, it must be said that its climax and basic characteristic was by no means mysticism but rather that rationalism which was manifested in the formalistic and abstract discussions of Scholasticism and in its greatest theologians and philosophers. Also the hierarchic tendencies of medievalism were counterbalanced by its emphasizing the absolute value of every single Christian soul. It is wrong to bring the high spiritualistic and radically anti-natural-

McCormick in the New York Times of June 10, 1942.

istic medievalism into any connection with Nazism, which is essentially anti-Christian, anti-spiritualistic, and anti-personalistic. The anti-Christian trend to Nazism is so obvious that everybody who tallies or compromises with it is marked as not being Christian in earnest. The frequent attempts of Catholicism to come to terms with Nazism and to avoid fighting it, except when the power of the Catholic Church itself is threatened directly, is, in my opinion, the strongest objection to be made against Catholicism.

6) The Nazi ideology denies the pre-suppositions, ends, and desirability of modern civilization. This leads many to misinterpreting it as reactionary in the sense of being opposed to modern science and philosophy, as well as to the facts and natural tendencies of modern life.

But, Nazism draws only the ultimate conclusions from modern science and life and thus makes visible the sins and absurdities implied in the present human existence and consciousness.

Modern philosophy starts as a revolt against "Eidola" that is illusions which are, as merely subjective creations of consciousness, opposed to objectively existing reality. It ends by perverting the natural meaning of truth, reason, and knowledge into their opposite, namely illusion, produced by some psychical or biological powers which force us to take something as real and objective which does not exist at all, but is only in our consciousness.

Modern philosophy starts by rejecting abstract speculation on God and asked for science to serve only practical human ends (Bacon, Gallileo, and Desacrtes). It ends with declaring that failure is the absolute principle (Jaspers)

and that man is nothing, come from nothing and goes to nothing (Heidegger). In its beginning modern science declares that space, time, mass, causality figures and geometrical shape were the last constant and real principles to which all phenomena were to be traced back. It ends with the denial of the objectivity and constancy of these very principles.

In the beginning modern science was opposed to the abstractness of Scholasticism; it ends with the loss of any concrete intuition of modern mathematics and physics. We see, it is not necessary to refer to romanticism or a specific German inclination for absurdities in order to explain Nazi ideology. Even the doctrine that success decides who is right and that moral and truth is what is useful in Germany—even that is plain bragmatism.

7) But it may be that all those severe contradictions and absurdities in the development of modern philosophy and science have been necessary prerequisites and concomitant phenomena of modern technology. It may be the real meaning of modern philosophy and science serve as working-hypothesis and blinkers which enabled man to concentrate all his energies nearly exclusively on industrial progress. The decisive point, however, is that Nazism accepts only the negative sides and rejects the positive ones in the complex of human civilization.

A common denominator can be found for all Nazi ideology and practice. The Nazis themselves like to call this common denominator "Faustian", "dynamic", or "heroic." It has the qualities defined by Spengler as the essence of Western civilization.

Careful analyses, however, reveal the qualities as the symptoms of radical disease. They represent the attitude of

for whom means, work, production, effort, strife, and struggle have become ends in themselves. He has become a useless cog in the gigantic industrial process which was originally set in motion in order to render him free and happy. With a man has lost sight of anything other than himself. He has lost faith in Reason, Truth, God, Kindness, Justice and Beauty; he does not even believe in pleasure and enjoyment. Joy is converted into a means for power ("strength through Joy"). Since there is no goal to set behind all his driving, *driving itself becomes his God*. He sees his permanent activity as an end in itself, Faustian, and his fight, without anything to fight for, heroism. He tries to compensate for the inner dissatisfaction by orgies of power and destruction; he wants at least to control and destroy the goods which he himself is unable to enjoy. In short, he becomes a barbarian and converts all positive ends of the modern world into negative ones.

While it is the obvious aim of technology to liberate mankind from want, poverty, and mutual self-destruction, Nazism wants slavery and war. While it is also the purpose of modern technology to bring all nations into closer spiritual contact by removing the physical barriers between them, Nazism preaches that nations are basically unable to understand each other because of racial differences.

Nazism is a world-wide threat just because it represents a potential danger for every nation which faces the temptation created by the immense power granted to man through his new tools. No nation is safe from the danger of converting all the wisdom and blessings of modern technology into a nonsense and curse.

8) A real ideological fight against Nazism, if it is to be convincing, must avoid the very common mistake of assuming that our democratic ideals are to be accepted as right without question. To disprove this assumption has been the goal of the most serious Nazi ideology. Therefore, a discussion of Nazi ideology must begin by demonstrating *why* freedom, justice, humanity, and respect of the dignity of every human being are meaningful ends in themselves.

It must be kept in mind that the continuous stubborn following of a doctrine which was once new and revolutionary is not necessarily progress; it can be the very opposite, and be spiritual inertia and stagnation. On the other hand, a progressive movement sometimes starts as a renewal of or "renaissance" of movements and principles which had been "overcome" centuries before. The symbol of spiritual progress is the spiral.

9) Modern man's dislike of all *absoluteness* of truth and value has nothing to do with his particular preference of religious tolerance and political freedom, although he may try to say that it does. The relativism which he has adopted is merely another expression of the same "dynamic" spirit which finds its best representation in the Nazi talk of a specific "German justice and morality", a "German truth", and a "German mathematics." Freedom of discussion serves as a guarantee against the misuse of absoluteness, but it is not an argument against it. Since Nazism is more truly the heir of the anti-Christian, and anti-spiritualistic naturalism and relativism of our age than any other progressive movement, therefore, the only way to fight Hitler ideologically consists in reestablishing faith in absolute values.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON MARXIST COMMUNISM

By ARNOLD NASH

Marxism is both a development of, and yet a protest against, liberal thought. Like pragmatism, Marxism maintains that knowledge must serve a social purpose and that it is socially conditioned, but like liberalism Marxism believes in the possibility of the universalization of knowledge through the development of science. Indeed the word *science* is a key to the understanding of the whole Marxist position. Marx and Engels called their system *Scientific Socialism* to distinguish it from that advocated by their opponents in the socialist ranks, whom they dubbed *Utopian* socialists since, argued Marx and Engels, these reformers were more concerned with describing the future socialist state than in discovering a method of achieving it, whereas as scientific socialists they believed that it is less important to draw up a detailed description of Utopia than to devise a plan of getting there. Marx and Engels frankly adopted the basic methodological principle of the natural sciences and applied it to history. In their hands it became: if we wish to precipitate a successful revolution when the appropriate moment comes, we must examine past revolutions and then hitch ourselves consciously to the historical process. They quite deliberately preclude, so they thought, any condemnation of capitalism on ethical grounds. In their judgment they were simply being

"scientific" since they maintained that they were predicting the future of the economic system through their capacity to understand it in the present in the light of the past. In the words of modern devotee, J. B. S. Haldane:

"It is, however, of the utmost importance to realize that though Marx and Engels thought capitalism was unjust, their reason for believing that it should come to an end within a relatively short time was not because it was unjust, but because it was not working."⁽¹⁾

Upon this foundation a complete philosophy of life, dialectical materialism, has been erected. It is totalitarian in two senses: it has an answer to every question, and the answer is one to be imposed upon all who claim to believe the theory, or who live under Soviet jurisdiction.

It is in its optimism that Bolshevism is most closely akin to liberalism. However whereas the liberal rationalist is confident that if only man will rid himself of the dead weight of superstition and tradition then there are no limits to what he can accomplish by pursuing the methods of the natural sciences both in controlling nature and society, the Marxist believes that this is only possible if science is first cleansed of its bourgeois associations. Thus to use the ambitious words of an Irish Marxist, J. B. Bernae

1. *Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences*, p. 197 (New York, 1937)

"The great contribution of Marxism to extend the possibility of rationality to human problems to include those in which radically new things are happening for . . . Marxists have some way of analysing the development of affairs which enables them to judge far in advance of scientific thinkers what the trend of social and economic development is to be."

It is this over-confidence in the adequacy of their analysis that is largely responsible for the failure of the communist parties seriously to affect the thinking of the working classes of the Anglo-Saxon world. Looking back over a personal acquaintance with orthodox communists, of more than a decade, one fact emerges clearly and that is their optimism in defiance of all facts to the contrary. The eternal cry of the Marxist prophets has been that capitalism is collapsing because of its own inner contradictions (whatever that means) and that therefore the successful revolution is around the corner." What has been most astounding is the persistence of such optimism in the face on the one hand, of the increasing hold of liberal democracy in the Anglo-Saxon countries exactly at the times when capitalism has been obviously in a state of crisis, and on the other hand, of the continual defeat of communist parties or policies as evidenced in the political success of Fascism on the continent of Europe. Thus, in the early thirties, in Germany it was the Nazi party that increased in strength as the economic depression got worse. In Great Britain it was a "National" government, pledged to social reconstruction on the basis of orthodox capitalism, that was swept into office in 1931. In the U. S. A. the lesson of the Great Depression to the masses, judging from the

enthusiastic election of Roosevelt to the Presidency in 1932, was not that capitalism was doomed and its complete removal necessary, but that, in terms of a "New Deal," it could be made to work properly.

There are many reasons that can be adduced to account for the failure of communist teaching to grip the minds of the working classes of the world. One basic cause is simply that the typical Marxist exponent is never as rational as befits an exponent of scientific socialism. Unlike Hitler, he has used his opportunities for propaganda as the immediate means of outlet for the emotions, hates and fears of the moment. Hence his use of verbs like "smash," "destroy," "exterminate," etc.—a vocabulary that, to the psychologist, is of profound significance. This failure of the communist to use his reason to control his emotions has often blinded him to any real understanding of the way in which the mind of the typical skilled artisan moves.

Unlike the Nazis, the communists are so much the children of a liberal era that by hook or by crook they will insist on attempting to explain all their policies as consistent with both past actions and present theory. The oscillations of Communist party strategy over the last few years furnish numerous illustrations of this self-immolation on the altar of consistency, for, no matter the cost, all policies and all actions must be demonstrated as consistent.

In the summer of 1939, we were assured repeatedly by communists in England that any possibility of a rapprochement between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia was impossible. Such an idea was an invention of the capitalist press. Eventually, when the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed and the photographs of

Stalin shaking hands with Ribbentrop appeared in the press, all that my still-believing acquaintances could say was that Stalin *must* have *some* good reason for doing what he did. One could only comment to them: "Now, as never before, you realize what the writer of the book of Job meant when he exclaimed 'Even though he slay me yet will I trust him'."

Soon after war finally broke out, Mr. Harry Pollitt, the Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain, wrote the following words:

"... to stand aside from this conflict, to contribute only revolutionary-sounding phrases while the Fascist beasts ride roughshod over Europe, would be a betrayal of everything our forebears have fought to achieve in the long years of struggle against capitalism."

However, before the end of the month, the Communist Party of Great Britain in conjunction with the other constituent parties of the Third International, reversed this interpretation of the war situation in obedience to orders from the Kremlin. This view of the matter would not, of course, be accepted by an orthodox communist. If questioned on the reasons for the change in policy, he replies, to use the words of one of them:⁽¹⁾

"We communists made a mistake. When on September 2 we enunciated the policy of the 'war on two fronts,' we thought it was possible to point out all this, to support the war against German imperialist reaction, while at the same time exposing and weakening British imperialism, which has built German reaction to a menace, and seeks, not to

destroy it in the interest of progress, but to make it subservient.

"Our ear is close not to telephone wires from international mystery cities, but to the British working class, to factories and to homes, and it did not take many days' practical experience of this policy to teach us that it just wouldn't work."

At all costs the orthodox communist must prove not that his propaganda is in accordance with Stalin's foreign policy—that would be understandable and intellectually respectable—but that it is in accordance with the working-class opinion. That is a procedure which is as unavailing in fact as it is foolish in logic.

Each Communist Party organized a campaign, during the autumn of 1939, urging that the war was simply an "imperialist" war, the continuation of which was contrary to the interests of the working classes throughout the world. The defeat of Poland, it was maintained (which by then had been divided between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union), brought to an end any reason for the continuation of hostilities. Indeed the *Daily Worker* soundly trounced the British and French Governments of the day in unmistakable terms, for starting and prolonging the war:

"Hitler repeated once more his claim that the war was thrust upon him by Britain. Against his historical fact there is no reply. Britain declared war, not Germany. Attempts were made to end the war, but the Soviet-German peace overture was rejected by Britain. All through these months the British and French Governments have had the power to end the war: they have chosen to extend it."

1. Ivor Montagu in an article *Communist Policy* in the *Fabian Quarterly*, Winter, 1939, p. 31.

By the end of 1940 "People's Conventions" were being organized throughout Great Britain urging a policy of what, following Lenin's technique of 1917, was called "revolutionary defeatism." It was maintained that a "... people's government could formulate peace proposals and, while effectively defending us from foreign imperialism, could appeal to the people of conquered countries to form their own people's government."

It was clear to everybody that such a government would have to go on fighting Hitler until similar governments had been formed on the Continent of Europe appealing over Hitler's head to the German people. Nowhere did the advocates of the policy explain either how this could be done or how Hitler could be fought on the basis of the principle "revolutionary defeatism."

In view of its claims to be scientific, Marxism stands or falls with its success in predicting and not only in interpreting but understanding the changes and chances of the political scene. In the hands of its communist exponents, this has signally failed to do. What we may validly call its rational scholasticism meant that it has functioned as a closed system and not—as it can be—as a fruitful instrument of social analysis.

It is this feature in the communist brand of Marxism that inevitably kills any hope that it can furnish the liberal democratic countries with the foundations for the new *speculum mentis* of politics. Like the scholasticism of the middle ages, the scholasticism of the typical communist has no place for new facts, for, come what may, "the party line" must be vindicated and the ways of Stalin justified to man.

Soon after the Nazi armies invaded the Soviet Union the whole Communist movement in Britain raised the cry of a Second Front. The Soviet Union plainly needed it. Then began the twisting—not to say manufacture—of facts to prove that the working classes in Great Britain, like the rank and file of the army, were well nigh universally in favor of a second front. As early as September 1941, Claud Cockburn, the London correspondent of *New Masses* cabled his paper to the effect that the men in the British army were "violently impatient with all the delays in the creation of a second front and the excuses offered for them."

Although the situation has considerably changed since then, nothing was further from the truth *at that time*, as a description of the temper of the British working classes, both within the army and on the production belt. On the contrary, their mood—I am describing, not vindicating it—was rather expressed by the sentiment:

"The Soviet Union precipitated this war by signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Who in the long run *caused* it, whether it was Adolf or Neville, is neither here nor there for the moment. We do know that when Joe Stalin signed his agreement with the ex-champagne salesman, war became inevitable and Joe knew it. Well then, let the Soviet Union do some of the fighting now. A bit of a rest won't do us any harm and in any case we've got to be quite ready and not half-armed as we were in Norway. When the second front comes we don't want any more retreats like Dunkirk, Greece or Crete. Let us therefore supply the Red Army with any tanks, guns or planes we have available but for Heaven's sake, let us wait until our lads are properly equip-

ped before we make any more excursions to the continent of Europe."

Neither is scholasticism of this type characteristic only of those communists who are marooned in the benighted world of the liberal democratic states. It is even more obvious in the U. S. S. R. as it is revealed, for example, in the official defence of the emergence of a socially stratified society based on economic privilege. The possibility of a "classless" society—whether it is or was inevitable is not the point—was really ruled out when Stalin revised Marx' dictum "From each according to his capacities, to each according to his needs" so that it became "From each according to his special capacities, to each according to his special needs." Around the Kremlin a bureaucracy has arisen with all the paraphernalia of class, such as special privileges and a higher standard of living. Joseph E. Davies, when he was the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union was invited to lunch at the home of Madam Molotov. In his memoirs he laconically remarks:

"The table was filled with hors d'œuvres. Luncheon was elaborate and many courses—three kinds of meat—six kinds of fish."

This class stratification runs throughout the whole of the Soviet Union. Writers, artists, leaders of dance bands, along with high government officials occupy positions near the apex of the social pyramid. Skilled workmen and technicians follow. They, unlike the former group, may not have their country homes or *dachas* in the country, but dif-

ferences in housing and modes of dress (especially among their wives) tell only too plainly that class-consciousness is far from dead. The next lower grade of the pyramid consists of the ordinary factory worker, and, occupying the broad base at the bottom, are what in England or the U. S. A. would be called the "farm hands." Their social stratification is not based upon trivial differences of economic reward. Sir Ernest Simon, the English social economist, has worked out the ratio of the real income of municipal street-cleaners in various cities of the world and that of the highest paid officials of the municipality or state. Moscow and London came off with, from the egalitarian point of view, the worst figures, about 1:30, whereas for Stockholm, Copenhagen, Brisbane and Wellington the ratio varied from 1:6 to 1:9. Similarly, in the armed forces all the indicia of rank have appeared—titles, medals, decorations, epaulets and gold braid.

However the faith of the communists is ever adequate to remove such a mountain of class-stratification and Mr. Davies like any other questioning individual, received from his acquaintances in the Kremlin the perfect scholastic reply that

"... on the Marxian theory there is no class distinction except that which exists between the workers and a capitalistic property-owning class which exploits them, and, inasmuch as this is a socialistic enterprise for the benefit of the State and, has no capitalistic property-owning class, therefore in the proper sense of the word, there are no 'classes' because of these differentiations."

LOVE YOUR ENEMIES

By REINHOLD NIEBUHR

In times of social and political conflict there are always Christians who obscure the very genius of the New Testament conception of love by their particular interpretation of one form of the love commandment, namely, "Love your enemies." They insist that it is not possible to love anyone with whom one is in conflict, and that it is important for this reason never to come in conflict with anyone.

These idealists agree with the cynics to regard the commandment to love our enemies as demanding a psychological and moral absurdity of us. Without fully realizing it, they have changed the function and have given it quite a different meaning. This new meaning could be expressed in the words: You must love all men, and since it is impossible to love an enemy, you must have no enemy.

A certain rather hysterical Christian idealist is at the present moment touring the country with the message that all people who are participating in the war will become so corrupted by hatred that they will be incapable of contributing to decent peace. He is, therefore, calling upon the handful of non-participants to hold themselves in readiness to build a new world after the rest of us have ruined

If the idealists, who place this interpretation upon the New Testament commandment, were really correct, it would be necessary to sacrifice even the most cherished principles and to become traitors to even the most solemn responsi-

bilities, if any one dared to oppose the principles or to challenge our discharge of the responsibilities. For to remain true to our trust would bring us into conflict with those who oppose us and conflict invariably betrays into hatred.

There must be something wrong with this theory. There is, in fact, a good deal of evidence to refute it. Wars and conflicts undoubtedly tempt many people to hatred, but this hatred is not nearly as universal as our idealists assume. And it is least general among those who are engaged in the actual horrors of belligerency. The old ladies back home may do a good deal of hating. But the soldiers upon the battlefield usually do not hate. They have a much more impersonal attitude toward the conflict than is usually assumed. As one of the commanders of the British army recently wrote to the Moderator of the Church of Scotland, "morale is not strengthened by hatred but only by a moral purpose, which transcends personal and individual consideration." The Moderator had objected to a new type of school in the British army which was encouraging hatred. The army man expressed his agreement with the objections of the church leader.

Not all soldiers remain free of hatred. But there have been men in situations of conflict through all the ages who understood something of the difference between the evil which they oppose, and the hapless and tragic individuals who are for the moment the embodiment of that evil. This distinction is possible

even if the individuals, who are the instruments of the evil have acquiesced in it. How can we measure the degree of consent which a German soldier gives the Nazi creed? Or how can we know his responsibility or lack of responsibility for the convictions which he may hold in a system of government which does not allow individuals to form convictions freely?

The source of confusion in regard to the love commandment is partly a linguistic one. It is derived from the poverty of the English language. The word "love" in English covers many shades of meaning. It means everything from a purely physical desire of one person for another to the sacrificial passion which ended upon the Cross.

The "Greeks had a word" for love which the New Testament did not find adequate to express its highest conception. That word was EROS. The connotations of that word linger most obviously in the English adjective derived from it—the word "erotic." It is a word which is rooted in the natural life of sex and which defines, first sexual, and ultimately other forms of attachment between people. Plato did his best to spiritualize the concept, and his "intellectual love" is something which quite transcends physical desires. But it may be questioned whether it ever transcends the interests of the ego.

At any rate, the New Testament used a Stoic word AGAPE and filled it with new meaning, when it sought to define the love of the Kingdom of God. This love is something more than even the most refined form of sympathy for it does not depend upon the likes and dislikes which men may have for each other. It is not determined by interest or passion. It is not the love which we have

for people because we share common ideas with them, or because we are intrigued by the tilt of their nose, or because we admire their intellectual brilliance, or because we take pity upon their weakness. The Swedish theologian Professor Nygren, has sought to prove in his interesting work "Agape and Eros" that the classical and the Christian conception of love stand in opposition to each other. In this he may have overstated the case. For when Jesus compares parental affection (which certainly belong in the category of EROS) with God's love, as he does in the words, "Ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children how much more will your heavenly father give good gifts to them that ask him," he is not setting EROS and AGAPE in complete contradiction to each other.

There is, nevertheless, a distinction between them. The love which the gospel demands is justified and validated only transcendently. We are asked to love our enemies that we may be children of our Father in heaven. An attitude of spirit is enjoined without any prudential or selfish consideration. We are not told to love our enemies because in that case they will love us in return. The love which is asked of us does not move on the plane of emotion or desire.

Such a love is not easily achieved. In a sense no one ever perfectly achieves it. But it is, at least, no psychological absurdity. It does not demand that we should be emotionally attached to someone with whom we are in conflict. It does demand that we should desire the good of our enemy. If achieved, it purges us of hatred; for hatred always has an egoistic root. In so far as even the purest devotion to principle never completely excludes consideration of our own

terests, there will, therefore, be an element of egotism in the defense of our cause and an element of hatred in our opposition to the enemy. But in so far as it is possible to defend a cause, not primarily because it is to our interest to do so, but because we regard the cause as objectively right, it is also possible to contend against the opponents of that cause without hatred.

The love which the New Testament defines as AGAPE is spiritually difficult; but it is psychologically possible. Emotional attachment between people upon the basis of any number of considerations is spiritually easier, but it is psychologically impossible to have such attachments across the chasm of any historic conflict.

It would be foolish for Christians to deny the difficulty of avoiding hatred in conflict. Already the literature which seeks to fasten a congenital guilt upon the German race is tremendous. Human beings, who have a natural inclination to accept the most adverse evidence estimating the virtues and vices of groups other than their own, are bound to accentuate this error in times of conflict.

Nor is it easy to desire the good of an opponent when in the immediate instance we are doing him harm. There will always be moralists who will laugh and jeer at the very attempt of combining this ultimate attitude with the immediate tragic task in hand. If they were wholly right, no officer of the law could ever arrest a criminal, and no warden could ever jail him without hatred. Though we have known of police officers, who were filled with vindictive passion toward criminals, there certainly have been many others who have genuinely desired the ultimate good of the

hapless men whom they were forced to harm in the immediate instance. International conflicts are, of course, never completely analogous to these instances of domestic justice. For they offer no such vantage point of disinterested judgment, from which blame and punishment may be apportioned. But it would be ridiculous to assert that there can be no moral and spiritual disinterestedness in international affairs, simply because there is no political vantage point for its expression. Morals do not depend upon politics as slavishly as that.

Sometimes the idealists who insist most rigorously upon the impossibility of loving those with whom we are at war, are not as scrupulous as they might be in their conflict, short of war, with their opponents. William Lloyd Garrison was certain that the Christian ethic forbade the Civil War. But we hated the Southern slave owners with a personal hatred and failed to make any distinction between the historic evil of slavery and the individuals who were caught in the system. Guilty of a lack of AGAPE toward his opponents before the North and South were in overt conflict, he insisted that there should be no overt conflict because it would not be possible to maintain EROS during the war. He never knew to what degree his self-righteous hatred of the South actually contributed to the inevitability of the conflict.

The hatred of an enemy who does not fight us but merely opposes us is frequently combined with the pious avowal that we will not fight because we do not want to hate anyone. The confusion may be aggravated by the linguistic difficulties to which we have referred. But its root lies deeper than the poverty of a language.

PHOSPHORUS

Green as a gourd,
Innocent as a lamb,
Dumber 'n hell—
All those?
When I went to work
In Chicago
In the steel mills,
Among the pig-machines,
And Bessemers,
And blast furnaces—
With their tuyeres
(New word
To me—tuyeres).

Green,
Because I did not know
The first thing
About the workings
Of a steel mill.
So the first day
I carried iron rods
On my shoulders
To the blacksmith.
Poor shoulders!
About two p.m.

Innocent,
Because I did not know
The first thing
About the workings
Of capital and labor.
Labor simply meant
People who got jobs—
Here,
If they wanted
To work here;
There,
If they wanted
To work there—
Capital was who
Or what
Paid the wages,
With double-time
For over-time.

Dumber 'n hell—
That is simply
Some rustic poetry
That roughly describes
The parlous state
Of my naive thoughts
And notions,
Notions including one
About what to do
With a man
Who is dead,
A notion less vague
Than the ones
About what to do
With a man
When he's alive.

All right,
There I was—
Learning fast enough,
Perhaps;
Being helped somewhat
By a graduate
From a school of mines
In Rolla, Missouri;
He was aiming
At a job
Such as Superintendent.
He had learned
What to do
With the stuff he worked with—
Iron and steel
I mean.

He told me—
This young foreman—
To get a shovel,
Scoop up some coke,
And throw it into
A ladle of iron,
Molten iron,
Beautiful,
Brilliant,
Liquid iron!

He told me
 To get a shovel,
 Scoop up some coke,
 And throw it into
 A ladle of iron
 To keep the liquid
 From "freezing"
 "Freezing"—
 Funny talk that,
 To me,
 At first).
 Speaking of liquid iron—
 It was fun,
 At first,
 To toss junk
 Into the liquid
 And see it disappear,
 Merge into the liquid.
 Scrap iron,
 Worn out shoes,
 Any old thing;
 But we never,
 Of course,
 Threw in a workman!
 Though we did say,
 Casually,
 That'd be
 A helluva thing
 To fall in,
 Wouldn't it?"
 But my young foreman
 Told me one day
 That a man had fallen
 Into a ladle
 Of molten iron
 Which had coke on it
 To keep the liquid
 From freezing;
 And that gave me
 A new problem
 To worry about.
 What to do
 With a man who dies?
 Back home
 We buried him,

With ceremony,
 And praise,
 And song.
 But we never
 Had to bury
 A man who had become
 Hot liquid
 Along with
 A lot more
 Of hot liquid
 Which wasn't man.
 Twenty, thirty,
 Maybe fifty tons!
 Do they bury
 Fifty tons
 Of molten iron
 With a man in it?
 And do they wait
 Until the stuff
 Has frozen?
 It was a new
 And bewildering puzzle
 The first time.
 I thought about it
 After it had
 Actually happened.
 Ask my foreman,
 He would know.
 "What will they do
 With fifty tons
 Of molten iron
 With a man in it?"
 (He casually told me
 What I suppose
 He would not tell
 The man's wife
 And children)
 "Oh,
 They'll send it
 On through—
 It'll run
 A little high
 In phosphorus."

W. GORDON ROSS,
 Berea College, Berea, Kentucky.

THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN

By RONALD A. LANDOR

Essentially why man lives is revealed in the truth of the relationship between him and God. The fact of man's sinfulness is a part of this truth, and perfectly typical of the whole of it. Not knowing the depth of our ugliness, we can only confess it as a fact. Sin does not admit the solace of a final accounting so that there could be an end of uneasiness. We cannot come to peace simply by reading off the faults of which we are aware, because a note of dishonesty penetrates every level of our awareness ("Who can understand his errors? Cleanse Thou me from secret faults." Psalm 19:12). Contrition is brother to contempt for those not repenting as nicely as we, and prayers for mercy are punctuated by pride that we pray for mercy.

It is man's situation that he must *wholly* attest what *partly* dwells in depths unknown. What this means is that he must act, love, suffer, and die in an environment whether the only possible resource for holding that these are not forever lost is simple faith.

If faith is man's final consolation, this kind of consolation is most offensive, for it implies dependence and despair—the very elements which cannot be admitted into calculations that are far from exhausting all the apparent means of deliverance. Yet faith, not without its cunning, asks: What are the consolations of unbelief? By what magic does the amassing of privilege, money, authority,

pleasure, prestige, women, self-righteousness, or information even the balance against one iota of meaningless sorrow? These consolations may be helpful to the type of despair that the sufferer is conscious of and yet wishes to feel is not really significant. He possesses a bravado about knowing that he is "lost," if he doesn't know it too well. The despair which "interests" or "amuses" him is then but the whitecap employed to hide a bottomless depth of real and mortal agony. The unbeliever has apprehensions of his profound despair and dependence, but nevertheless desperately seeks the consolations which do not require the confession of these apprehensions.

The specific content of the consolation of faith is that we are known, and called, and loved by God. If this is foolishness, it must not be despised; for though we be duped, and faith a lie, a fraud and a delusion, there is only the answer that in believing that we are the children of God, our hearts possess more convincing proofs of meaningfulness and the gladness thereof that in believing that we exist without foundation other than chance and without hope beyond the grave.

It is admittedly a fantastic process. Can the terrible reality of suffering be vanquished by dreams? For man, dreams are his hardest reality. They break him upon the cold anvil of having to contain the god he fails to be. Yet it

a god he fails to be. Fiery potentialities of grace, and joy, and art, and love remain. Man has no dreams which are only dreams. The heart, too, is a battleground.

While it is the function of the heart to dream, it is the function of the head to tell the true dreams from the false, the good from the bad. The heart is to the head what the artist is to the critic. The heart must not mistake illusion for vision, and the head must not mistake judgment, or discovery, for creation. The heart must be hardened with intelligence, and the head must be quickened with imagination.

It is true that faith doesn't face "reality," if by reality is really meant a cynic-hatred of life. It doesn't face it because it has already faced the very worst of life—and been allowed to live. The love of life is not, as it is sometimes represented, a simpleton's cheerful ignorance of horrors and obscenities; but it depends upon the understanding and trust with which is related the very ugliest elements of squalor and evil, and the most tragic of misery and death, to life's ultimate redemptive meaning.

Broken-heartedness and loving kindness are the acts for which faith is the true name. It is they which are the very living center of man, for there God's love is most truly known. It is there that the truth of our relationship with Him occurs. Our knowledge of this truth is identical with the power to act according to it. Faith has no distinctions between contemplation and action, theory and practice, knowledge and

power. Our understanding of God dwells in our longing for Him, and can no more be divided from it than either from revelation, or than the spirit from the flesh in the living heart. Faith or works is a false alternative. They are one. Many are the believers who do not know to love, and the non-believers who do. Faith is the entrusting of our being, not only the admission of His.

Man's situation may be conceived to take place inside of a triangle whose base is "infinitely" wide, and whose vertex is death. Starting from the base, and as we get older, the horizon narrows. Faith reverses the triangle so that the horizon, instead of narrowing unto death, is now the base, which is infinite. Biblical faith, in holding that God is our Father, holds life as the most that it is and that it could be. The tree of small religion, of meager vision, is known by its blossoms of colorless existence. Judeo-Christianity turns the dull grey of inert meaninglessness into the fresh and living green of Canaan ("Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." Heb. 11:1). There is nothing more incredible, and yet nothing more crucial, than that man's salvation is God's own desire.

Biblical religion extends to every individual and to every nation the solemn counsel that only a just world can have peace, only a free world can be just, and only a God-fearing world can be free. Individual happiness and social democracy are plants whose roots must be in holy ground, or die.

MEETING OF THE FELLOWSHIP

The Fellowship of Socialist Christians held its annual meeting at Northover Camp, Boundbrook, N. J., on September 16-17. The topics discussed were "The Relations of Power to Justice According to the Christian Faith," and "The Problem of Race in Domestic and International Politics." On the first topic Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr and Prof. Carl Mayer of the New School lead the discussion. Prof. Mayer's paper on "Power and International Organization" will be published in the next issue of this magazine.

Herbert King, of the Student Division, Y. M. C. A., Staunton Lautenschlaeger, Presbyterian missionary in China, and Miss Haung led the discussion on the problem of race. The conference was most successful though war conditions reduced the attendance.

The following new members were elected to the executive committee: Dorothy Fosdick, B. Apelian, J. Daniels and Herbert King.

The Fellowship decided to raise \$150 for a negro institute to be held this fall at the Providence Cooperative Farm. Eighty dollars of this amount was raised at the conference. Other contributions toward the total will be gratefully received.

Report on Christianity and Society revealed that the quarterly had one of its best years, though the Fellowship must still subsidize it to the extent of \$200 per year. Two hundred more subscribers would eliminate this deficit. We need your help in extending the influence of the quarterly.



OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Liston Pope, is Assistant Professor of Social Ethics at the Yale Divinity School.

Maximilian Beck is a Czech philosopher, formerly editor of "Philosophische Blaetter, who is now in this country.

Eduard Heiman is Professor of economics of the Graduate Faculty of the New School.

Eduard F. Ouellette, is Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, The Dalles, Oregon.

W. Gordon Ross, is Professor of philosophy of religion of Berea College, Berea, Ky.

Ronald A. Landor, has just been inducted into the Army.

Winnifred Wygal is on the staff of the National Board, Y. W. C. A.

Arnold Nash, who was formerly our representative in England, is now connected with the Christian Student Movement in Canada.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CHRISTIAN AND THE WAR,
by Charles Clayton Morrison, Willett
Clarke and Co. \$1.50.

This book contains most of the editorials which the editor of the *Christian Century* wrote to justify his qualified support of the war, after he had spent hysterical years trying to keep the country out of war. The argument by which he achieves his justification is partly fatalistic and partly nationalistic.

His fatalism is expressed in the idea that once war is declared war has become an "existential reality" as "substantial as a fact of nature" which "makes the arguments over rights and wrongs prior to the war irrelevant." Neither "the soldier nor the pacifist can defend his course by the canons of a simple morality." "Necessity" has entered into the picture.

The difficulty with this position is that it makes too sharp a distinction between historical reality as it expresses itself in times of peace and in times of war. History is always full of necessity as well as of freedom. That is why the canons of a "simple morality" are never adequate to it. Before the war the editor of the *Century* was a voluntarist who imagined that Christian conscience could act as if historical circumstances had not indeed created a great peril which had to be met. There were factors in the historical situation before the war which were beyond the control of any one or any number of human wills. Now that the war is upon us, the editor denies the element of freedom in history for the sake of a pure fatalism. He thinks the arguments of soldiers and pacifist have become irrelevant before the "necessity" of war. The

position of the pacifist is, of course preferable to such fatalism. The pacifist knows that conscience has no right to abdicate in this manner. History is always a realm of human decisions; and if it demands decisions which are absolutely intolerable, the Christian has a right to withdraw and take the consequences.

This sudden shift from a moralistic voluntarism to an unmoral fatalism is a nice indication of the inadequacies of the moralistic types of Christian faith for which the *Christian Century* speaks.

The shift from a Christian internationalism to an unchristian nationalism is equally pathetic. Before the war Dr. Morrison accused those of us who thought that isolationism was un-Christian of trying to rationalize our subordination to the "state." We were worshipping "Caesar" rather than Christ. It did not occur to him that many of us were more insistent upon our responsibilities to the world community than any official of the government dared be. Now he justifies support of the war upon purely nationalistic grounds. He declares that "when the nation's destiny has been committed to the arbitrament of gun and tank and bomb, every citizen faces three simple questions and the *question of righteousness is not among them*; Do I want my country to live? Do I want its independence preserved? Am I willing to do the monstrous evils which war requires in order to maintain the power upon which the independence of my country now depends?"

Dr. Morrison should have recognized that motives of national loyalty enter the picture before war is declared. Do we

have to consider only overt perils to national existence and not covert ones, particularly if they are not so very covert? Do we actually have to wait until the enemy strikes us? This absolute moral distinction between what happened before the real and the symbolic Pearl Harbor and what happened after is a ridiculous one.

But the idea that after the peril to national existence has become overt, nothing else matters and not other question of righteousness can be considered is even more absurd. Where would the Christians of Germany be if they thought that the Christian conscience must abdicate before the "necessity" of history in this way?

One trembles to think what kind of confusion this curious combination of fatuous internationalism in times of peace and semi-Nazi nationalism in time of war will sow in the period of reconstruction. It will probably produce another chimera of Kellogg-Briand pack.

R. N.

CONDITIONS OF PEACE, *by Edward Hallett Carr*, MacMillians. \$2.50.

Perhaps the reason why many Christians have hailed Professor Carr's proposals for international reconstruction is because he, as specialist in international politics, regards our crisis as primarily moral. He declares: "The moral crisis of the contemporary world is the breakdown of a system of ethics which lay at the root of liberal democracy, of national self-determination and of laissez-faire economics."

The book begins with a plea for the recognition of the necessity of basic change for the creation of an orderly world. He calls attention to the fact that

the victorious powers were complacent after 1918. They were satisfied and thought themselves secure. Meanwhile the peoples and leaders of the "dissatisfied Powers," stripped to the bone by their defeat, started on new adventures. Whether in armaments or in ideas in leadership or in policy they built from the ground up and generated a new vigor out of their very despair.

Professor Carr believes that Germany won the 1918 peace while losing the military victory. He is concerned lest that happen again. A spirit of vengeance, lack of imagination, lack of adventure, may well be the result of the titanic forces being unleashed in the present war and the defeat of the values for which the struggle is being waged. Old men with old ideas have led the "satisfied Powers" since 1918. Strategy, French, English and American, was retrograde; "an amalgam of nineteenth century preoccupations and of the lessons of the war of 1914-18" while the initiative passed to the vanquished.

This introductory discussion of the reasons for the failure of the democracies leads the author to point out that "neither security nor peace can properly be made the object of policy." Happiness, security, peace are achieved not when sought as goals but by meeting the conditions for life at its best, conditions which include disciplines, costs, and a realistic awareness of the factors in the situation both cosmic and historical." The only stability attainable in human affairs is the stability of the spinning top or the bicycle . . . the condition of security is continuous advance," in political, economic and social areas of life. The desire must be "not to stabilize but to revolutionize." This is a revolution, says the author, against liberal democracy, na-

onal self-determination and laissez-faire economics.

The chapter on the crisis of democracy turns on the question "why democracy at the interval between the two wars became inert and why political rights, once the subject of embittered dispute, seemed meaningless or unimportant to a multitude perhaps even a majority who possessed them."

The analysis of the crisis of self-determination turns on the issue of rights in relation to obligation, with an interesting corollary discussion about the confusion which the author feels people have made between self-determination and nationality, between self-determination of states and that of nations. In passing we cannot read this chapter without wondering why the Macmillan Publishing Company fail to capitalize the word Negro in a day when both literary usage demand such capitalization.

The crisis of economics seems to Professor Carr most clearly to illustrate the failure of the satisfied countries to adjust outworn forms of thought to a new and revolutionary age. He believes that (a) the pursuit of individual interests cannot be regarded as the motive power of the economic system; (b) the quantitative conception of wealth must yield to a qualitative conception in terms of welfare; (c) a new conception of the relationship between production and consumption is required. "The subject of modern economics is man in society," says Professor Carr. "Personality in Community," is the way religious leaders put the same idea. On this basis he takes an unequivocal stand against economic inequality and unemployment as arch enemies of an adequate social organization for nations and for the world. While these convictions break with class-

ical economics, yet the chapter on economics is less not altogether convincing. He relegates trade unions, for instance, to the past on the grounds that they are a concomitant of laissez-faire economic organization. Certainly the experience of movements like the Cooperatives of Denmark, or the Soviets in Russia suggest the continued need of unions. The significance of numerous non-government functional groups operating in a democracy as one way to express public sentiment and provide control of government is a reason for the trade union which is not referred to by the author.

Professor Carr refers to Christianity and communism as the two movements today purporting to offer to the world a universal principle or purpose which supersedes war. These he dismisses with one paragraph each. Of Christianity he says that it suffers from institutionalism and creedalism, that it has lost the masses, that it is frequently identified with reaction and that only unless Christianity be recreated can it become a foundation for rebuilding the world. He credits the Christian Movement with valuable insights and thinks some of the world's future leadership may perchance arise in the Church, but he views Christianity with no real hope for practical world reconstruction. Possibly this is his way of saying that the job of political reconstruction has no commerce with the job of Christianity. Against communism, the charge is reliance upon material process rather than a moral end. While it has moral purposes and is credited with having influenced for good, yet its function in the future is assumed to be incidental.

Perhaps Professor Carr has an eight point program for a new international morality. He describes his position as "the new faith" and its tenets are:

1. The new faith must speak in positive rather than in negative terms.
2. The new faith must appeal predominantly to the little man, elsewhere described as the small business man and the unorganized consumer.
3. The new faith will address itself first of all to the solution of the economic problem—particularly unemployment and inequality.
4. The new faith will approach unemployment "by way of the creation of needs vast enough to make a full call upon our resources and morally imperative enough to command sacrifice to supply them."
5. The new faith will revive and renew the ideal of economic equality.
6. The new faith will lay more stress on obligations than on rights.
7. The new faith will provide for readjustment of the attitude of nations that their rights rather than their obligations are central.
8. The new faith will reopen the debate between liberty and authority and achieve a new synthesis. "The crisis," repeats the author, "cannot be explained and much less solved in constitutional or even in economic terms. The fundamental issue is moral."

The concluding chapters seek to relate these eight principles to the immediate historical future. Britain is the focus of this analysis which deals with domestic British problems, with Britain and the World, Britain and Germany, and Europe. One is amazed that a chapter on Britain and the World not so much as mentions India.

His sections on the United States is brief but fair and creative, shot through as it must be with frank criticism of our political ineptitudes.

Special reference should be made to the superb chapter on Britain and Germany which commends itself heartily to all who endorse Professor Tillich's treatise in the August 10th, 1942, issue of *Christianity and Crisis on Spiritual Problems of Post-War Reconstruction*. This chapter is truly adventurous.

Conditions of peace is the work of a great student and of an honest but conservative thinker. Though he is a realist who wins our agreement on page after page of his argument, yet one frequently has the feeling that he is the victim of some of the nineteenth century thought which he so roundly condemns. One may agree that peace cannot come by disarmament or collective security pacts but only by a system which will meet the psychological and economic pressures of an international community. Yet one may question the emphasis which he places upon the military power of governments in the name of his new morality. One might ask whether this is not a revelation of his own enslavement to the past.

This book, like many others on the same subject, confronts us with the problem of relating historical realism to some loyalty to ultimate values in such a way that both false optimism and cynicism are avoided. Professor Carr clarifies many issues and forces those who disagree with him to formulate their own position more clearly.

Winnifred Wygal.